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Abstract. Fault attacks can target smart card programs in order to
disrupt an execution and gain an advantage over the data or the embed-
ded functionalities. Among all possible attacks, control flow attacks aim
at disrupting the normal execution flow. Identifying harmful control flow
attacks as well as designing countermeasures at software level are tedious
and tricky for developers. In this paper, we propose a methodology to
detect harmful intra-procedural jump attacks at source code level and
to automatically inject formally-proven countermeasures. The proposed
software countermeasures defeat 100% of attacks that jump over at least
two C source code statements or beyond. Experiments show that the re-
sulting code is also hardened against unexpected function calls and jump
attacks at assembly level.
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1 Introduction
Smart cards or more generally secure elements are essential building blocks for
many security-critical applications. They are used for securing host applications
and sensitive data such as cryptographic keys, biometric data, pin counters, etc.
Malicious users aim to get access to these secrets by performing attacks on the
secure elements. Fault attacks consists in disrupting the circuit’s behavior by
using a laser beam or applying voltage, clock or electromagnetic glitches [5, 6,
24]. Their goal is to alter the correct progress of the algorithm and, by analyzing
the deviation of the corrupted behavior with respect to the original one, to
retrieve the secret information [14]. For java card, fault attacks target particular
components of the virtual machine [3, 4, 9].
Many protections have therefore been proposed to counteract attacks. Fault
detection is generally based on spatial, temporal or information redundancy at
hardware or software level. In java card enabled smart cards, software compo-
nents of the virtual machine can perform security checks [18, 20, 10].
In practice, developers of security-critical applications often manually add
countermeasures into an application code. This operation requires knowledge
about the target code vulnerabilities. Both these tasks are time-consuming with
direct impact on the certification of the product. One harmful consequence of
fault attacks is control flow disruption which may bypass some implemented
countermeasures. It is difficult for programmers to investigate all possible con-
trol flow disruption in order to detect sensitive parts of the code and then inves-
tigate how to add countermeasures inside these sensitive parts. Moreover, secure
smart cards have strong security requirements that have to be certified by an
independent qualified entity before being placed on the market. Certification can
rely on a review of source code and the implemented software countermeasures.
The effectiveness of software security countermeasures is then guaranteed by the
use of a certified compiler [21]. Injecting control flow integrity checks at compile
time would require to certify the modified compiler. To avoid this difficult and
expensive task, countermeasures must be designed and inserted at a high code
level.
In this paper, we propose a full methodology 1) to detect harmful attacks
that disrupt the control flow of native C programs executed on a secure ele-
ment and 2) to automatically inject formally verified countermeasures into the
code. In the first step of our methodology, the set of harmful attacks is deter-
mined through an exhaustive search relying on a classification of attack effects
from a functional point of view. The identified harmful attacks can be visual-
ized spatially in order to identify the affected functions and to precisely locate
the corresponding sensitive code regions. Following our methodology, a tool au-
tomatically injects countermeasures into the code to be protected without any
direct intervention of a developer. The countermeasure scheme proposed in this
paper operates at function level. Countermeasures rely on counters that are in-
cremented and checked throughout execution enabling detection of any attack
that disrupts control flow by not executing at least two adjacent statements of
the code. The effectiveness of the proposed countermeasure scheme has been
formally verified: any attack that jumps over more than two C statements is
detected. This is confirmed by experimental results for three well-known encryp-
tion algorithms and additionally results show that 1) attacks are much more
difficult to perform on the secured code and that 2) attacks trying to call an
unexpected function are detected.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related work. Sec-
tion 3 gives an overview of our methodology detecting application weaknesses
and automatically securing an application code. Section 4 details the detection
of weaknesses and visualization. Section 5 and 6 respectively presents the coun-
termeasures for hardening a code against control flow attacks and the formal
approach used for verifying their correctness. Section 7 presents experimental
results.
2 Related work
This section discusses work related to fault models before presenting previously
proposed countermeasures for smart card and control flow integrity.
2.1 Fault models
Countermeasures are necessarily designed with respect to a fault model specify-
ing the type of faults an attacker is able to carry out [27]. Elaborating a fault
model requires analysis of the consequences of physical attacks and modeling
them at the desired level (architectural level, assembly code level, source code
level). Consequences of fault attacks, at program level, include the processing
of corrupted values by the program, a corrupted program control flow or a cor-
rupted program as a result of changed instructions. In this paper, we focus on
attacks that impact control flow of native C programs.
Several works [24, 2] have shown that attacks can induce instruction replace-
ments. For example, electromagnetic pulse injections can induce a clock glitch
on the bus during transmission of instruction from the Flash memory resulting
in an instruction replacement [24]. Such an instruction replacement can provoke
a control flow disruption in the two following cases:
1. The evaluation of a condition is altered, by the replacement of one instruc-
tion involved in the computation, causing the wrong branch to be taken.
Inverting the condition of a conditional branch instruction by only replacing
the opcode in the instruction encoding has the same consequence.
2. The replacement of a whole instruction by a jump at any location of the pro-
gram. The executed instruction becomes a jump to an unexpected target [9,
24]. The same effect is obtained if the target address of a jump is changed
by corrupting the instruction encoding or, in case of indirect jump, if com-
putation of the target address is disrupted. This also happens if the program
counter becomes the destination operand of the replacing instruction, e.g.
an ALU instruction such a PC = PC +/- cst which are the most likely to
succeed into a correct jump.
In this paper, we consider jump attacks as described in the second case just
above.
2.2 Code securing and control flow securing
Code securing techniques can be applied to the whole application or only to
specific parts. Securing only sensitive code regions requires to know weaknesses
which need to be strengthened for a given fault model. When considering some
convenient fault models or when varying input, tractable static analysis, such as
taint analysis, can be used to infer the impact of a fault on control flow [12] or to
detect missing checks [29]. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has
considered a jump attack fault model probably due to its complexity: all possible
jumps from one point of the program to another point have to be considered.
Protections against control flow attacks depend then on the nature of the
attacks. If the evaluation of a condition involved in a conditional branch is dis-
rupted at runtime, recovering techniques must strengthen the condition compu-
tation. This can be achieved by inserting redundancy and appropriate checks [5].
Countermeasures designed for ensuring control flow integrity or code integrity
often rely on signature techniques or on checks to ensure the validity of accesses
to the instruction memory or of the target address of jump instructions.
Signature techniques typically rely on an oﬄine computation of a checksum
for each basic block. At runtime, the protected code recomputes the checksum
of the basic block being executed and compares with the expected result. Dedi-
cated hardware [28, 15] can be used to compute signatures dynamically. However,
solutions requiring hardware modification are unpractical for smart cards. Sev-
eral works proposed to integrate the checks at software level [26, 13, 16]. Oh et
al. [26] only checks the destinations of all jumps. Bletsch et al. [8] focus on
return-oriented attacks. Abadi et al. [1] proposed a broader method for ensuring
control flow integrity which checks for both the source and the destination of
jumps. However, this approach relies on a new machine instruction.
For javacard enabled smart card, software components of the virtual machine
can perform security checks. Basic block signature computations and checks can
then be carried out by the virtual machine, as proposed by [18]. A transition
automaton, in which each state corresponds to a basic block and each transition
corresponds to allowed control flow, can also be built by analyzing the byte-
code [10]. Calls to setState(), added to the source code, instruct the virtual
machine to check the integrity of the control flow by comparing the current state
with the allowed ones according to the automaton. The virtual machine can also
check the validity of the bytecode address to avoid the execution of any byte-
code stored outside the applet currently being executed [20]. However, a small
jump inside the allowed bytecode, for example inside a function, would not be
detected and might have serious consequences for security. These java card ap-
proaches rely on the ability to perform runtime checks during the interpretation
of the bytecode. For native programs, it is mandatory to include any software
countermeasure inside the code, as proposed in [26, 13, 16].
Approaches that verify the direction or the target address of branches or
jumps only harden the control flow integrity at basic blocks boundaries. This is
not sufficient to cover physical faults that cause an unconditional jump from an
instruction inside a basic block to another instruction inside another basic block.
The approach proposed in this paper enforces the control flow integrity with a
granularity of one C statement, which is finer than basic block granularity.
Two previously proposed approaches also use a step counter to protect a code
region [10, 25]. The former targets computation disruption while the latter com-
bined counters with a signature approach at assembly level to ensure tolerance
to hardware fault. The use of a certified compiler requires to work at the source
code level as proposed in this paper. Our approach, based on counters, is similar
to the intra basic block approach of [25] for securing sequential code. But our
approach operates at higher code level and is able to harden control flow of high
level constructs.
Thus, in the specific context of smart cards or secure elements, to the best of
our knowledge, no research work has proposed formally verified and experimen-
tally evaluated countermeasures at C level that ensure control flow integrity in
the presence of jump attacks during native execution.
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Fig. 2. Injection of jump attacks at C level
3 Weakness detection and code securing; overview
This section gives an overview of our methodology, supported by tools and rep-
resented in Figure 1, to help developers to improve the security of smart card
C codes subject to physical attacks inducing jumps. Our approach starts with
a functional C code of the application. A distinguisher is necessary in order to
discriminate between an execution that gives advantage to an attacker and an
execution that does not. The full code security analysis and securing methodol-
ogy can be split into two main steps.
The first step identifies the weaknesses in the code by simulating all possible
attacks during code execution. The output of all these executions is passed to
a classification tool that classifies attacks as harmful or as harmless. We refer
to these classes as bad and good, respectively. While the bad class contains all
attacks that give advantages to the attacker, the good class is the set of attacks
that have no effect from a security point of view.
The second step consists in hardening the code. It relies on automated injec-
tion of countermeasures that ensure control flow integrity for any function that
has been successfully attacked in the first step. The design of the countermea-
sures is detailed in Section 5 and the verification of their correctness is explained
in Section 6. Note that, once a code has been secured, the evaluation of the
efficiency of the implemented countermeasures or the identification of remaining
weaknesses can be achieved by returning to the weaknesses detection step.
We have also implemented a visualization tool offering a graphical represen-
tation of the attacks classification and enabling to have a look at the code regions
corresponding to harmful attacks.
4 Detection of weaknesses and visualization
In this section, we describe the part of our methodology that identifies harmful
attacks. The identification of weaknesses is carried out by simulating, classifying
and visualizing physical attacks at source code level.
4.1 Simulation of attacks
Motivations to work at source code level. As code securing is often performed
at source level by developers, simulating attacks at this level allows to identify
the harmful ones as well as the code regions that should be secured. Simulat-
ing attacks at assembly level would require to match assembly instructions with
the source code which is not trivial [7]. Furthermore, assembly programs are
tightly coupled to specific architectures. Thus, simulating attacks at assembly
programming limits portability. It is also time-consuming. Indeed, simulation of
attack injection at the source code level speeds up the detection of weaknesses
compared to injection at assembly level due to the lower number of source state-
ments. However, jump attacks that start/arrive inside a C statement cannot be
simulated at C level [7]. Nevertheless, it is helpful to detect as many weaknesses
as possible at source code level, and as we show in the experimental results,
working at this level enables to strengthen code security by making successful
attacks very difficult to perform.
Simulation of C level attacks. In order to discover harmful attacks, we simulate
jump attacks using software hacks at C level, as proposed in [7]. For each function
of the application, all possible intra-procedural jump attacks that jump backward
or forward C statements are injected at source level. Figure 2 illustrates all
possible jumps within a function, sorted according to their distance expressed
in statements. Statements in this context are C statements such as assignments,
conditional expressions (e.g. if (cond1) or while(cond2)) and also any bracket
or syntactic elements (e.g. }else{ or the bracket between P14 to P15) that
impact control flow.
4.2 Classification of simulated attacks
The benefits of an attack differ depending on the application and the context
of its use. A successful attack may break data confidentiality (by forcing a leak
of sensitive data such as an encryption key or a PIN code) or may break the
integrity of an application (by corrupting an embedded service). In order to cover
the various benefits for an attacker in a general way, our methodology requires a
distinguisher to be provided. This distinguisher must be able to classify as bad
any execution where an attack has succeeded in breaking the expected security
property of the code. Other attacks can be assigned to the good class. A finer
classification of the effects of an attack can be achieved by providing a more
precise distinguisher. In the remainder of the paper, we consider four different
classes: bad: during execution a benefit has been obtained by the attacker; good:
237 void aes addRoundKey cpy(
uint8 t *buf, uint8 t *key,
uint8 t *cpk)
238 {
239 register uint8 t i = 16;
240
241 while (i--)
242 {
243 buf[i] ^= key[i];
244 cpk[i] = key[i];
245 cpk[16+i] = key[16+i];
246 }
247 ;
248 }
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Fig. 3. Result of weakness detection for the aes addRoundKey cpy function
the behavior of the application remains unchanged; error or timeout: the program
has seemed to not terminate and has to be killed or finished with an error
message, a signal (sigsegv, sigbus, ...) or crashes; killcard: a countermeasure
has detected an attack and has triggered a security protection to terminate the
program and possibly to destroy the card. We assume that no benefit can be
obtained by an erroneous or endless execution, so both error and timeout cases
are distinguished from bad cases in the remainder of the paper. If an error is
preceded by a gain, such as a leak of sensitive information, the distinguisher
must be able to discriminate between these attack effects.
4.3 Weaknesses analysis and visualization
Since our securing scheme operates at function level, the detection of weaknesses
aims at identifying harmful attacks at source code level in order to identify the
functions to be secured. Thus, any function that, when attacked, exhibits a bad
case is considered for the countermeasure injection. The tools supporting our
methodology offer a visualization tool that can be used by a security expert or a
developer to quickly understand which variables and functionalities are involved
in the generation of harmful attacks by analyzing the jumped part of the code.
The visualization tool builds a graphical representation of the results of the
identification of weaknesses by drawing a square at the coordinate (source line,
target line) using the color associated to its class. To illustrate this, consider the
function aes addRoundKey cpy of an implementation of AES-256 [22] in C, used
later in experiments, given in Figure 3. The distinguisher considers as bad any
execution producing incorrect encrypted data, representing the attacker’s ability
to disrupt the encryption. The visualization of the weaknesses is illustrated in
the right part of Figure 3. All except one forward jump generate a bad case
(orange squares correspond to a jump size of one statement, red squares to a
larger jump distance). Analyzing statements impacted by these harmful attacks
shows that the whole loop body, hence the whole function, must be secured.
#define DECL_INIT(cnt, x) int cnt; if ((cnt = x) != x) killcard();
#define CHECK_INCR(cnt, x) cnt = (cnt == x ? cnt +1 : killcard());
#define CHECK_INCR_FUNC(cnt1, x1, cnt2, x2) cnt1 = ((cnt1 == x1) && (cnt2 == x2) ? cnt1 +
1 : killcard());
#define CHECK_END_IF_ELSE(cnt_then, cnt_else, b, x, y) if (! ((cnt_then == x && cnt_else
== 0 && b) || (cnt_else == y && cnt_then == 0 && !b))) killcard();
#define CHECK_END_IF(cnt_then, b, x) if ( ! ( (cnt_then == x && b) || (cnt_then == 0 && !
b) ) ) killcard();
#define CHECK_INCR_COND(b, cnt, val, cond) (b = (((cnt)++ != val) ? killcard() : cond))
#define RESET_CNT(cnt_while, val) cnt_while = !(cnt_while == 0 || cnt_while == val) ?
killcard() : 0;
#define CHECK_LOOP_INCR(cnt, x, b) cnt = (b && cnt == x ? cnt +1 : killcard());
#define CHECK_END_LOOP(cnt_while, b, val) if ( ! (cnt_while == val && !b) ) killcard();
Fig. 4. Security macros used for control flow securing
5 Countermeasure for C code securing
In this section, we present the countermeasures we have designed to detect jump
attacks with a distance of at least two C statements. These countermeasures deal
with the different high-level control-flow constructs such as straight line flow, if-
then-else and loops. Countermeasures are presented in C-style in Appendix A
and use the macros shown in Figure 4. Note that all macros are expanded to
only one line of source code.
5.1 Protection of a function and straight-line flow of statements
To secure the control flow integrity of a whole function or a whole block of
straight-line statements, our securing scheme uses a dedicated counter. Each
function or each block of sequential code has its own counter to ensure its con-
trol flow integrity. Counters are incremented after each C statements of the
original source code using the CHECK INCR macro. Before any incrementation, a
check of the expected value of the counter is performed. When a check fails, a
handler named, killcard() as the one used in smart card community, stops the
execution.
To ensure control flow integrity, checks and incrementations of counters need
to be nested. Consider the example in Figure 5 that illustrates the countermea-
sure for a function g with a straight-line control flow composed of N statements.
The dedicated statement counter cnt g is declared and initialized outside the
function, i.e., in any function f calling g prior to each call to g. The initialization
associated to the counter declaration is surrounded by two checks and incremen-
tations of the counter cnt f dedicated to the block of the function f where g
is called. Moreover, the initialization value is different for each function which
enables the detection of any call to another function as shown in the experi-
ments. A reference to the counter cnt g is passed to g as an extra parameter.
Upon return from g, a check of the values of both counters cnt f and cnt g is
performed in order to detect any corruption of the flow inside the function g.
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Fig. 5. Securing function call and straight-line flow
This way, any jump to the beginning of the function is detected inside the called
function g. Any jump to the end of a function is caught when the control flow
returns to the calling function. The nesting of counter checks is at the core of
our countermeasure scheme ensuring control flow integrity.
5.2 Conditional if-then and if-then-else constructs
High level conditional control flow refers to if-then or if-then-else constructs,
illustrated by the example on the left part of Figure 6. The securing scheme for
conditional flow is illustrated in the right part of the Figure. For such a construct,
our securing scheme requires 2 counters cnt then and cnt else (for the control
flow integrity of each branch of the conditional construct) and one extra variable
b to hold the value of the condition of the conditional flow. Declarations and
initializations of cnt then, cnt else and b are performed outside the if-then-
else block. Similar to functions or straight-line blocks, these new statements
are interleaved with checks and incrementations of the counter cnt used for
the control flow of the surrounding block. This is performed by the additionnal
statements in the red box on the upper right part of Figure 6.
The condition evaluation in the secured version is performed through the
macro CHECK INCR COND: if the counter cnt for the flow integrity of the sur-
rounding block holds the expected value, cnt is incremented and the condition is
evaluated. Thus, any jump attack over the condition evaluation is detected after
the if-then-else construct, when checking the cnt counter. The extra variable b is
set to the value of the condition, in order to be able to distinguish, after the exe-
cution of the if-then-else construct, which branch has been taken. Both counters
dedicated to the conditional branches are then checked according to the value
of b. This is performed by the code corresponding to the CHECK END IF ELSE
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L6;        }
L7:        else        
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L9:        stmt3;
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Fig. 6. Securing conditional control flow
macro inserted between two checks of the counter cnt. Again, this nesting of
counter checks is at the core of the effectiveness of our countermeasure scheme.
5.3 Loop constructs
We have also designed a countermeasure scheme for loops. Due to lack of space,
we only present while loops. Any other loop constructs (for, do while) can
be rewritten into a while construct. The left part of Figure 7 shows a while
loop and the corresponding control flow between statements stmt 1, stmt 2 and
stmt 3 of the surrounding sequential code. Our countermeasure scheme uses one
counter, cnt while, for securing the control flow of the loop body. Similar to
conditional constructs, our countermeasure scheme requires an extra variable b
to hold the value of the loop condition. The variable b is needed at the end of
the loop to verify correct execution of the loop body and correct termination of
the loop. This is performed by the CHECK END LOOP macro which is surrounded
by CHECK INCR of the counter cnt. The b variable is declared and initialized
outside the loop as for the other constructs. The initial value must be true: if
an attack jumps over the loop, b holds true and the CHECK END LOOP macro,
checking for b being false after the loop, detects the attack. The cnt while
counter is reset before each initial iteration using the RESET CNT(cnt while,
val) macro with val being the final value of the counter after one iteration.
The reset is performed only if cnt while is equal to 0 or to the value val that
is expected after one complete iteration. As a jump from the end of the loop
to the beginning of the body would result in a correct value for cnt while that
is reset before each new iteration, the first check inside the loop body of the
while counter is guarded with b to detect a jump attack leading to an additional
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Fig. 7. Securing loop control flow
iteration of the loop. Moreover, the evaluation of the condition (that may update
an induction variable) is performed along with a check and an incrementation
of the counter cnt while using the CHECK INCR COND macro. Hence, any attack
that jumps over the evaluation of the condition of the loop will then be detected
inside the loop.
We have also designed a countermeasure scheme for other C constructs such
as switch case, break, multiple returns, goto. Due to space limitations and
their absence in applications we have considered, they are not presented here.
6 Formal verification of countermeasures
Formal verification of our securing scheme helped us designing effective coun-
termeasures and gives strong confidence in their effectiveness against attacks. In
this section, we present the models used for program execution from a control
flow point of view and for jump attacks, as well as properties to check to ensure
the control flow integrity of a secured program execution even in presence of
attacks. The verification of the correctness of the secured code is based on an
equivalence checking with the original code.
6.1 Code representation and decomposition for CFI verification
From a control flow perspective, a program execution can be viewed as the exe-
cution of a sequence of statements. A high-level program can be represented as a
transition system whose states are defined by the values of variables of the pro-
gram (contents of the memory) and of the program counter whose value specifies
a source code line in the C program. Any transition mimics the state transforma-
tion induced by the execution of an individual statement: updating the program
counter and potentially changing variables or the contents of memory. Figure 8
illustrates the representation of a program as a transition system.
A program can be decomposed into functions, and any function body can
be decomposed into top-level code regions containing either only straight-line
statements or a single control flow construct (loops or if-then-else). Sequential
execution of these regions guarantees that, if the control flow integrity is ensured
at the end of a code region, the following code region starts with a correct input
from a control flow point of view. Thus, the integrity of the control flow of both
code regions can be proven by proving the control flow integrity of each code
region. Our countermeasure scheme relies on securing each control flow construct
(function call/sequential code, if-then-else, while constructs) nested with few
straight-line statements of the surrounding block. Then, our approach consists
in verifying separately for each control flow construct enclosed with straight-line
statements of the surrounding block that all possible executions of the secured
version are stopped by a countermeasure in presence of harmful attacks or their
control flow is upstanding with respect to the initial code.
As control flow constructs can be nested, many combinations of control flow
constructs could be modeled. However, any control flow construct can be viewed
as a single statement which is correctly executed or not. Thus, in the models
used for verification of our countermeasures, we only consider straight-line state-
ments inside control flow constructs. The idea is that, if properties hold for each
individual construct, they hold for all of their combinations.
6.2 Models for verification of control flow integrity
State machine model. To model and verify the integrity of the control flow,
we associate to each statement stmt i of the original code of a function α a
dedicated verification counter denoted cntv αi. In the remainder of the paper,
we refer to such counters as statement counter. We model the execution of a
statement stmt i by incrementing its associated statement counter cntv αi.
Then, the execution of a sequence of statements is modeled by a transition
system TS, defined by TS = {S, T, S0, Sf , L}, where S is the set of states, T
the set of transitions T : S → S, S0 and Sf are the subsets of S containing the
initial states and final states respectively. The final states from Sf are absorbing
states. A state from S is defined by the value of the program counter and the
value of statement counters associated to every statement of the initial code. L
is a set of labels corresponding to the possible values of the program counter,
i.e. line numbers in the source code. Initial states are states with a program
counter value equal to the first line of the modeled code and where all statement
counters hold 0. Any transition from T is defined by the effect of the statement
stmt i associated to the program counter value. Transitions change the pro-
gram counter value to the next line number to be executed and increment the
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Fig. 8. Compact representation of TS for a function call and straight-line statements
statement counter cntv αi associated to stmt i of function α. A jump attack,
as considered, can only corrupt the program counter. Thus, for such attacks,
modeling the memory and other registers is not relevant.
To prove that our countermeasure scheme for a construct c is robust against a
jump attack and that its secured version is equivalent to the initial one, we build
two transition systems: one for the initial control-flow construct named M(c) and
another one for the version including countermeasures named CM(c). Figure 8
illustrates a compact representation of both transition systems for a generic
example code with a call to a function composed of straight-line statements.
In a secured version, checks may result in a call to killcard(). Hence, there
is an additional program counter value denoted killcard in any CM(c). All
states with this program counter value are final. All transitions labeled with a
countermeasure macro may change the program counter to killcard. Due to
the high number of such transitions, only a subset is represented in order to keep
the Figure readable.
Jump attack model. A jump attack is equivalent to the modification of the pro-
gram counter with an unexpected value. As our countermeasures are effective
against attacks that jump at least two lines, we add faulty transitions between
every pair of states of CM(c) separated by at least one line of C. These transi-
tions only update the program counter. The green arrows in CM(c) in Figure 8
illustrate all possible jump attacks occurring at line 3 of the code. As we as-
sume that only a single fault can occur, every fault transition is guarded with a
boolean indicating that a fault has already occurred.
6.3 Specification of control flow integrity and equivalence checking
To perform the verification of the control flow integrity and the correctness of a
secured code, we connect the two transition systems M(c) and CM(c) in order to
force the input (such as condition value, iteration counts), if any, to be identical.
The model checker builds a product of both models. We explain in this section,
the properties to verify on this product.
To verify the correctness of the secured code, in the presence or absence of
an attack, we need to prove that:
1. Any path in M(c) or CM(c) reaches a final absorbing state.
2. The statement counter values in any final correct state in CM(c) (with a
program counter value different from killcard) are equal to the statement
counter values in final states of M(c).
3. In CM(c) at any time and in any path, counters cntv αi and cntv α(i+1)
for two adjacent statements stmt i and stmt i+1 in a straight-line flow
respects 1 ≥ cntv αi ≥ cntv α(i+1) ≥ 0 or execution will reach a final
state with the killcard value for the program counter.
Property 2 ensures the right execution counts of statements in CM(c) if the
execution reaches a correct final state. Property 3 checks that line i is always
executed before line i+1 and after line i-1 or the execution will reach a killcard
state. By transitivity, this property, if verified by all statement counters, ensures
that in a straight-line flow, the statement of line k is always executed after line
i and before line l with i < k < l both in M(c) and CM(c). Hence, Property 3
ensures the right order of execution of statements.
For a conditional flow or for a loop, Properties 1 and 2 are the same but
the Property 3 changes slightly. For a conditional flow, such as the example
in Figure 6, Property 3 specifies that at any time in an execution path that
reaches a correct final state 1) the straight-line flow before and after the branches,
condition included, is correct and 2) inside both branches, condition included,
the straight-line flow is correct. Property 2 ensures that only one branch is
executed. For a while loop as in Figure 7, Property 3 says that at any time
in an execution that reaches a correct final state 1) the statements before and
after the loop (condition excluded) are executed only once and in order; 2) the
condition is never executed before its preceding statements, 3) statements inside
the loop, condition included, are executed in order but their execution counts is
not limited. Property 2 ensures the right number of iterations and Property 3
ensures the right control flow during execution.
We have chosen the Vis model checker [11] to prove the effectiveness of our
countermeasure scheme. After modeling all the constructs given in this section
and expressing the properties in CTL, all properties hold.
7 Experimental results
We implemented all software components4 presented in Figure 1. The counter-
measures for control flow securing as well as the jump attacks for the detection
of weaknesses are injected using a python C parser that manipulates the C
instructions. For the experiments, we considered three well-known encryption
algorithms available in C: AES [22], SHA [17] and Blowfish [17].
4 A demonstration video is available at: http://dai.ly/x205n3x
Table 1. Jump attack classification for original and secured version (+ CM)
bad bad good killcard error total
size > 1 size = 1
c jump attacks Attacking all functions at C level for all transient rounds
AES 7786 29% 1104 4.2% 17 372 65% 108 0.4% 26 370
AES + CM 0 528 0.2% 18 015 5.3% 318 972 94% 1 0.0% 337 516
SHA 32 818 75% 1528 3.5% 8516 19% 412 1.0% 43 274
SHA + CM 0 1149 0.3% 5080 1.2% 421 200 98% 261 0.1% 427 690
Blowfish 70 086 32% 3550 1.7% 134 360 62% 5725 2.7% 213 721
Blowfish + CM 0 2470 0.2% 331 664 23% 1 060 156 75% 6065 0.4% 1 400 355
asm jump attacks Attacking the aes encrypt function at ASM level for the first transient round
aes encrypt 1566 82.8% 36 1.9% 179 9.4% 111 5.9% 1892
aes encrypt + CM 627 0.2% 21 0% 63 040 20.2% 239 303 78.4% 2264 0.7% 305 255
asm call attacks Attacking all function calls at ASM level for the first transient round
AES 249 59.3% 139 33.1% 32 5% 420
AES + CM 0 21 5% 398 94.8% 1 0.2% 420
SHA 35 48.7% 13 18% 24 33.3% 72
SHA + CM 0 8 11.1% 61 84.7% 3 4.2% 72
Blowfish 9 21.4% 18 42.9% 15 35.7% 42
Blowfish + CM 0 18 42.9% 17 40.5% 7 16.6% 42
First, we simulated all the intra-procedural jump attacks at C level for each
function (such as in Figure 2). A simulated attack is transient and triggered once
during execution. However, using the gcov tool to determine how many times
each line is executed, we simulated all possible instances of jump attacks from a
Line i to a Line j. In all our experiments, the distinguisher classifies as bad any
attack that provokes program termination with corrupted output. The second
column of Table 1 shows that all attacks with a jump distance greater than or
equal to two C statements are captured by our countermeasures. For example,
32 818 jump attacks were harmful for SHA whereas none was for its secured
version (SHA + CM). The number of attacks jumping only one C statements is
also reduced (third column). More important, the ratio of the remaining jump
attacks of size one becomes very low (≤ 0.3%). For example, for AES the bad
cases of size one decrease from 33.2% to 0.2%.
Also, we simulated all possible intra-procedural jump attacks at assembly
level targeting the aes encrypt function of AES executed by an ARM Cortex-
M3 processor. We used the Keil ARM-MDK compiler and Keil simulator [19] for
the replacement of any instruction by a jump anywhere into the same function.
We considered only one function due to a very long simulation time (3 weeks),
highlighting the benefits to perform the attack simulation at source level. Re-
sults are presented in the asm jump attacks section of Table 1. The harmful
attacks in the secured version represent only 40% of the ones in the original
code: our countermeasures enable to defeat 60% of the attacks on this exam-
ple. Moreover, only 0.2% of attacks give advantage to the attacker while 78.4%
are detected. Thanks to the frequent checks added by our countermeasures, the
harmful attacks are much harder to perform on the secured code. It shows our
countermeasures are effective while being implemented at source code level.
Finally, we simulated attacks that call an unexpected function instead of the
expected one for all the benchmarks using the Keil simulator. Results, presented
Table 2. Size and overhead for original and secured version (+ CM)
x86 arm-v7m
Simulation Size Execution time Size Execution time
time bytes overhead time overhead bytes overhead time overhead
AES 27m 17 996 1.27 ms 4216 38.3 ms
AES + CM 9h 46m 30 284 (+68%) 2.61 ms (+106%) 15 696 (+272%) 191.7 ms (+400.5%)
SHA 1h 18m 13 235 1.47 µs 3184 106.5µs
SHA + CM 16h 52m 21 702 (+64%) 2.81 µs (+91%) 7752 (+143%) 499.1µs (+368%)
Blowfish 5h 52m 30 103 47.6 µs 6292 3.02 ms
Blowfish + CM 3d 6h 19m 46 680 (+55%) 70.6 µs (+48%) 16 396 (+161%) 6.3 ms (+109%)
in the asm call attacks section of Table 1, show that all harmful attacks are
captured and many harmless attacks are also detected. Thus, our countermea-
sures are also very effective against unexpected function calls.
Table 2 reports code sizes as well as execution times of both the original
version and the secured one, for a x86 target machine and a cortex-M3 processor.
For the x86 platform, the execution time overhead ranges from +59% (blowfish)
up to +106% (AES). For the embedded ARM processor, the overhead is higher as
the simpler processor does not exploit instruction level parallelism. The highest
overhead is also achieved for AES (+400%). As all functions of our benchmarks
exhibit vulnerabilities, they were all fully secured by our methodology. We will
consider in future work how to achieve at least the same level of security without
fully securing sensitive functions. However, as a smart card is primarily the host
of sensitive operations, ensuring the required security level is crucial. Full code
securing often implies such a high overhead [23, 25].
8 Conclusion
This paper has presented a methodology to automatically secure any C applica-
tion with formally verified countermeasures at source level. Results has shown
that these countermeasures defeat 100% of C jump attacks with a distance of
two statements or beyond. Moreover, our countermeasures are able to capture
all unexpected function calls. They also have been able to reduce significantly
the number of attacks injected at assembly level: for the studied function, 60%
of the assembly jump attacks were eliminated. Future work will address the op-
timization of countermeasure injection according to the weaknesses detection
step. If harmless attacks are found inside a function, countermeasures might be
adapted accordingly to reduce their cost while preserving their effectiveness.
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A Countermeasures securing codes
This section presents the implementation of the countermeasures of Figure 5, 6
and 7 using the macros of Figure 4.
The implementation of countermeasures for function calls and sequence of
statements are shown in the two listings below. The statement counter cnt g for
a function g must be initialized with a value different that the one for all other
functions in order to capture jump attacks that try to call another function.
Moreover, the range of values taken by the statement counter of a function must
be different from the ones of other functions in order to detect inter-procedural
jumps.
int g(int n, int m, int * cnt g){
CHECK INCR(*cnt g, 8)
statement;
CHECK INCR(*cnt g, 9)
...
CHECK INCR(*cnt g, 10)
statement;
CHECK INCR(*cnt g, 11)
return res;
}
int f(int * cnt f){
...
CHECK INCR(*cnt f, 15)
// initialization value 6= for each func.
DECL INIT(cnt g, 8)
CHECK INCR(*cnt f, 16)
x = g(p, q, &cnt g)
CHECK INCR FUNC(*cnt f, 17, cnt g, 12);
...
}
The listings below illustrate the implementation of the countermeasures for
an if construct (left) and for a while construct (right). The while construct
example contains the statements to be inserted to handle a for construct for
the initialization of the induction variable and its incrementation.
...
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 8)
statement;
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 9)
DECL INIT(cnt then, 1)
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 10)
DECL INIT(cnt else, 1)
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 11)
DECL INIT(b, 1)
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 12)
if (CHECK INCR COND(b, *cnt, 13, cond))
{
CHECK INCR(cnt then, 1)
statement;
CHECK INCR(cnt then, 2)
...
CHECK INCR(cnt then, 4)
}
else
{
CHECK INCR(cnt else, 1)
statement;
CHECK INCR(cnt else, 2)
...
CHECK INCR(cnt else, 6)
}
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 14)
CHECK END IF ELSE(cnt then, cnt else, b, 5,
7)
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 15)
statement;
...
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 8)
statement;
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 9)
DECL INIT(b, 1)
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 10)
DECL INIT(cnt while, 1)
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 11)
// optional induction variable
// initialization statement for a for
CHECK INCR(cnt, 12)
while: {
RESET CNT(cnt while, 8)
if (! CHECK INCR COND(b, cnt while, 0,
cond)) goto next;
CHECK LOOP INCR(cnt while, 1, b)
statement;
CHECK INCR(cnt while, 2)
statement;
CHECK INCR(cnt while, 3)
...
CHECK INCR(cnt while, 6)
// optional incrementation statement
// for a for
CHECK INCR(cnt while, 7)
goto while;
}
next:
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 13)
CHECK END LOOP(cnt while, b, 1)
CHECK INCR(*cnt, 14)
statement;
